Profit sharing as entry deterrence mechanism
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DOI: 10.1007/s10258-016-0113-x
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Cited by:
- Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2018. "Social Welfare and Profit-Sharing Rule in a Unionised Duopoly with Profit Tax/Subsidy," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 226(3), pages 59-84, September.
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More about this item
Keywords
Union-oligopoly bargaining; Fixed wage; Profit-sharing; Entry deterrence effect;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
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