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Union-Firm Bargaining agenda: Right-to manage or Efficient Bargaining?

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  • Luciano Fanti

Abstract

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions. It is shown that an agreement between p arties on the bargaining agenda may endogenously emerge only on the Efficient Bargaining arrangement, provided that union's power is not too high.

Suggested Citation

  • Luciano Fanti, 2014. "Union-Firm Bargaining agenda: Right-to manage or Efficient Bargaining?," Discussion Papers 2014/182, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:pie:dsedps:2014/182
    Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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    File URL: https://www.ec.unipi.it/documents/Ricerca/papers/2014-182.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Luciano Fanti, 2014. "When do firms and unions agree on a monopoly union or an efficient bargaining arrangement?," Discussion Papers 2014/181, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    3. Brown, James N & Ashenfelter, Orley, 1986. "Testing the Efficiency of Employment Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 40-87, June.
    4. repec:bla:scandj:v:87:y:1985:i:2:p:197-225 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vlassis, Minas, 2000. "Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union-oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 261-281, May.
    6. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    7. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
    8. John H. Pencavel, 1984. "The Tradeoff Between Wages and Employment in Trade Union Objectives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(2), pages 215-231.
    9. Kornelius Kraft, 2006. "Wage versus efficient bargaining in oligopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(7), pages 595-604.
    10. Vannini, Stefano & Bughin, Jacques, 2000. "To be (unionized) or not to be? A case for cost-raising strategies under Cournot oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1763-1781, October.
    11. Dowrick, Steve & Spencer, Barbara J, 1994. "Union Attitudes to Labor-Saving Innovation: When Are Unions Luddites?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 316-344, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luciano Fanti, 2014. "When do firms and unions agree on a monopoly union or an efficient bargaining arrangement?," Discussion Papers 2014/181, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficient bargaining; Right-to-manage; Cournot duopoly.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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