Coarse Matching
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Mazali, Rogério & Rodrigues-Neto, José A., 2013.
"Dress to impress: Brands as status symbols,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 103-131.
- Rogério Mazali & José Rodrigues-Neto, 2011. "Dress to Impress: Brands as Status Symbols," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2011-567, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Heidrun Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Emre Ozdenoren, 2011. "Coarse matching with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 75-104, May.
- Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2013. "Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design," Discussion Papers 1559, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Meyer, Margaret & Strulovici, Bruno, 2012.
"Increasing interdependence of multivariate distributions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(4), pages 1460-1489.
- Margaret Meyer & Bruno Strulovici, 2011. "Increasing Interdependence of Multivariate Distributions," Discussion Papers 1523, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Shao, Ran, 2016. "Generalized coarse matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 142-148.
- Gomes, Renato & Pavan, Alessandro, 2016.
"Many-to-many matching and price discrimination,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
- Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination," Discussion Papers 1578, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- De Fraja, Gianni & Sákovics, József, 2012.
"Exclusive nightclubs and lonely hearts columns: Non-monotone participation in optional intermediation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 618-632.
- Gianni De Fraja & Jozsef Sakovics, 2010. "Exclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Non-monotone Participation in Optional Intermediation," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 196, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- De Fraja, Gianni & Sákovics, József, 2010. "Exclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Non-monotone Participation in Optional Intermediation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8059, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- De Fraja, Gianni & Sákovics, József, 2010. "Exclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Nonmonotone Participation in Optional Intermediation," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-84, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2014. "The choice of the number of varieties: Justifying simple mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 7-21.
- Kos, Nenad, 2012. "Communication and efficiency in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 233-249.
- Blumrosen, Liad & Feldman, Michal, 2013. "Mechanism design with a restricted action space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 424-443.
- Terence Johnson, 2009. "Matching Through Position Auctions," Working Papers 001, University of Notre Dame, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2011.
- Pavlov, Gregory, 2008.
"Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 345-348, May.
- Gregory Pavlov, 2006. "Maximal Loss from Collusion in the IPV Symmetric Auctions," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-037, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Gomes, Renato & Sweeney, Kane, 2014. "Bayes–Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 421-437.
- Johnson, T.R., 2013. "Matching through position auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1700-1713.
- Condorelli, Daniele, 2012. "What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 613-624.
- Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 45-76.
- Ron Lavi & Ella Segev, 2014. "Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 791-819, November.
- Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
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