IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v42y2013i4p1085-1096.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Representation of finite games as network congestion games

Author

Abstract

Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Igal Milchtaich, 2013. "Representation of finite games as network congestion games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 1085-1096, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:4:p:1085-1096
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May.
    2. Milchtaich, Igal, 1996. "Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 111-124, March.
    3. Milchtaich, Igal, 2009. "Weighted congestion games with separable preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 750-757, November.
    4. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Igal Milchtaich, 2021. "Internalization of social cost in congestion games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 717-760, March.
    2. Cominetti, Roberto & Dose, Valerio & Scarsini, Marco, 2024. "Monotonicity of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 316(2), pages 754-766.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2009. "Existence of Pure Strategies Nash Equilibria in Social Interaction Games with Dyadic Externalities," CEPR Discussion Papers 7279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Milchtaich, Igal, 2009. "Weighted congestion games with separable preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 750-757, November.
    3. Olivier Tercieux & Mark Voorneveld, 2010. "The cutting power of preparation," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 71(1), pages 85-101, February.
    4. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2015. "Cournot tatonnement and potentials," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 117-127.
    5. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2004. "Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 94-110, July.
    6. Penn, Michal & Polukarov, Maria & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2009. "Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 156-173, September.
    7. Holzman, Ron & Law-Yone, Nissan, 1997. "Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 85-101, October.
    8. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2018. "A universal construction generating potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 331-340.
    9. Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "The possibility of impossible stairways and greener grass," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 673, Stockholm School of Economics.
    10. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2007. "Best response adaptation under dominance solvability," MPRA Paper 4108, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Hollard, Guillaume, 2000. "On the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in group formation games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 283-287, March.
    12. Igal Milchtaich, 2015. "Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 515-541, August.
    13. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2014. "Strong equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities," MPRA Paper 55499, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2014. "Rosenthal's potential and a discrete version of the Debreu--Gorman Theorem," MPRA Paper 54171, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Lina Mallozzi, 2013. "An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 21(3), pages 523-539, September.
    16. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2010. "On continuous ordinal potential games," MPRA Paper 20713, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2001. "Learning in Games by Random Sampling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 55-84, May.
    18. Tobias Harks & Max Klimm & Rolf Möhring, 2013. "Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 461-482, May.
    19. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2011. "Games of social interactions with local and global externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-90, April.
    20. Patrick Maillé & Peter Reichl & Bruno Tuffin, 2011. "Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach," Post-Print inria-00560807, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network games; Congestion games; Potential games ; Game isomorphism; C72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:4:p:1085-1096. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.