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A universal construction generating potential games

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  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S.

Abstract

Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain "facilities." All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a regularity condition is satisfied by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; both congestion games and games with structured utilities are included in the class and satisfy that condition. Under additional assumptions the potential attains its maximum, which is a Nash equilibrium of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2016. "A universal construction generating potential games," MPRA Paper 71664, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:71664
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2007. "Congestion games revisited," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 57-83, September.
    2. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2011. "Games of social interactions with local and global externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-90, April.
    3. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2017. "Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 1-12.
    4. Milchtaich, Igal, 1996. "Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 111-124, March.
    5. Mark Voorneveld & Peter Borm & Freek Van Megen & Stef Tijs & Giovanni Facchini, 1999. "Congestion Games And Potentials Reconsidered," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(03n04), pages 283-299.
    6. repec:fth:tilbur:9998 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
    8. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2014. "Strong equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities," MPRA Paper 55499, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Equilibria in a Model with Partial Rivalry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 225-237, January.
    10. Tobias Harks & Max Klimm & Rolf Möhring, 2013. "Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 461-482, May.
    11. Nikolai S Kukushkin, 2004. "'Strategic supplements' in games with polylinear interactions," Game Theory and Information 0411008, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Feb 2005.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kukushkin, Nikolai, 2019. "Quasiseparable aggregation in games with common local utilities," MPRA Paper 93588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Gusev, Vasily V., 2021. "Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 295(3), pages 1180-1188.
    3. Nikolai S. Kukushkin, 2017. "Inseparables: exact potentials and addition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(2), pages 1176-1181.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Potential game; Congestion game; Game with structured utilities; Game of social interactions; Additive aggregation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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