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Can pumped-storage power stations stimulate rural revitalization? Evidence from the four-party evolutionary game

Author

Listed:
  • Wei Wang

    (School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University)

  • Yanbin Li

    (School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University)

  • Jinzhong Li

    (School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University)

  • Yun Li

    (School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University)

Abstract

This paper focuses on the social, economic, and environmental benefits of village development during the construction and operation of a pumped-storage power station (PSPS) in China. This paper provides an innovative perspective on new energy development in the context of rural revitalization. A four-party evolutionary game model was established that included the central government, local governments, PSPSs, and villagers. The evolution and stabilization strategies used in the development process of the rural revitalization were analyzed. The results show the following: (1) The greater the strength or amount of fines and penalties, the lower the cost of supervision, making it more conducive to the central government's evolution towards strict supervision. (2) The greater the tax revenues, the more likely local governments are to evolve towards active implementation. (3) The greater the social benefits, the more likely PSPSs are to evolve toward active participation. (4) The greater the resettlement compensation fees, wages, and donations, the more likely villagers are to evolve toward positive cooperation. We then provide appropriate suggestions on how PSPSs contribute to rural revitalization. This paper is important for improving the investment decision plan of PSPSs for rural revitalization and promoting China’s sustainable new energy.

Suggested Citation

  • Wei Wang & Yanbin Li & Jinzhong Li & Yun Li, 2024. "Can pumped-storage power stations stimulate rural revitalization? Evidence from the four-party evolutionary game," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 595-645, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:34:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00191-024-00867-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s00191-024-00867-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pumped-storage power station; Rural revitalization; Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary stability strategy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
    • R11 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes

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