IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/energy/v278y2023ics0360544223011362.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Building up scrap steel bases for perfecting scrap steel industry chain in China: An evolutionary game perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Liu, Yang
  • Cui, Mengying
  • Gao, Xubin

Abstract

China has stated that it will strive to reach the carbon peak by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 Carbon emissions. Steel industry as the largest manufacturing industry could reduce carbon emissions by using more environmentally friendly ways to make steel. Short process steelmaking is an environmentally friendly method. Scrap steel as the main raw material of short process steelmaking should be popularized. However, several issues happening in the scrap steel industry chain may hamper the formation of scrap steel bases. Therefore, we establish a tripartite evolutionary game model between Steel enterprises, Scrap steel enterprises and the government. After solving the equilibrium points and the evolutionary stable strategy of each stakeholder by the replicator dynamics equation, we carry out simulation to get the behavior strategy of Steel enterprises, Scrap steel enterprises and the government. The results show that: (i) there are three evolutionary stability strategies for the formation of scrap steel bases, among which the participate of steel enterprises and scrap steel enterprises, less intervention of the government is a more appropriate choice. (ii) there is a threshold effect on relevant parameters, which may change the evolutionary stability strategy of stakeholders. (iii) the initial willingness of steel enterprises, scrap steel enterprises and government affect the convergence speed of the evolutionary stable strategy. These conclusions provide unique insights and theoretical support for promoting the development of scrap and steel industry in China and helping to realize the strategy of carbon peak carbon neutrality.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Yang & Cui, Mengying & Gao, Xubin, 2023. "Building up scrap steel bases for perfecting scrap steel industry chain in China: An evolutionary game perspective," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 278(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:energy:v:278:y:2023:i:c:s0360544223011362
    DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2023.127742
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544223011362
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.energy.2023.127742?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
    2. Robert Sugden, 2002. "The evolutionary turn in game theory," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 113-130.
    3. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
    4. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1371-1399, November.
    5. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    6. Zhao, Tian & Liu, Zhixin, 2019. "A novel analysis of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology adoption: An evolutionary game model between stakeholders," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    7. Fang, Yujuan & Chen, Laijun & Mei, Shengwei & Wei, Wei & Huang, Shaowei & Liu, Feng, 2019. "Coal or electricity? An evolutionary game approach to investigate fuel choices of urban heat supply systems," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 107-122.
    8. Kampstra, R.P. & Ashayeri, J. & Gattorna, J., 2006. "Realities of Supply Chain Collaboration," Other publications TiSEM d3f62a32-db8b-43d2-b44f-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Kampstra, R.P. & Ashayeri, J. & Gattorna, J., 2006. "Realities of Supply Chain Collaboration," Discussion Paper 2006-59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    10. Ji, Shou-feng & Zhao, Dan & Luo, Rong-juan, 2019. "Evolutionary game analysis on local governments and manufacturers' behavioral strategies: Impact of phasing out subsidies for new energy vehicles," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Yong & Liu, Baoyin & Sun, Zhongrui & Yang, Ruijia, 2023. "Inter-regional cooperation in the transfers of energy-intensive industry: An evolutionary game approach," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 282(C).
    2. Zhang, Mingye & Yang, Min & Gao, Yangfan, 2024. "Tripartite evolutionary game and simulation analysis of electric bus charging facility sharing under the governmental reward and punishment mechanism," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 307(C).
    3. Lyu, Zhengwei & Lan, Hongjie & Hua, Guowei & Cheng, T.C.E. & Xu, Yadong, 2024. "How to promote Chinese food waste-to-energy program? An evolutionary game approach," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 293(C).
    4. Xia, Xiaoning & Li, Pengwei & Cheng, Yang, 2023. "Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of power battery carbon footprint disclosure under the EU battery regulation," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 284(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Liu, Jicheng & Sun, Jiakang & Yuan, Hanying & Su, Yihan & Feng, Shuxian & Lu, Chaoran, 2022. "Behavior analysis of photovoltaic-storage-use value chain game evolution in blockchain environment," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 260(C).
    2. Huang, Xingjun & Lin, Yun & Lim, Ming K. & Zhou, Fuli & Ding, Rui & Zhang, Zusheng, 2022. "Evolutionary dynamics of promoting electric vehicle-charging infrastructure based on public–private partnership cooperation," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 239(PD).
    3. Wei Wang & Yanbin Li & Jinzhong Li & Yun Li, 2024. "Can pumped-storage power stations stimulate rural revitalization? Evidence from the four-party evolutionary game," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 595-645, July.
    4. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
    5. Qianwen Wu & Qiangqiang Wang & Yongwu Dai, 2023. "Analysis of Strategy Selection in Third-Party Governance of Rural Environmental Pollution," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-19, May.
    6. Zhao, Dan & Ji, Shou-feng & Wang, He-ping & Jiang, Li-wen, 2021. "How do government subsidies promote new energy vehicle diffusion in the complex network context? A three-stage evolutionary game model," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
    7. Mansoor Saburov, 2022. "On Discrete-Time Replicator Equations with Nonlinear Payoff Functions," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 643-661, June.
    8. Wang, Yadong & Mao, Jinqi & Chen, Fan & Wang, Delu, 2022. "Uncovering the dynamics and uncertainties of substituting coal power with renewable energy resources," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 669-686.
    9. Cressman, R. & Schlag, K. H., 1998. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 260-285, December.
    10. Caihua Zhou & Hualin Xie & Xinmin Zhang, 2019. "Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(16), pages 1-18, August.
    11. Linlin Wang & Zhuo Li & Chengcheng Yuan & Liming Liu, 2024. "Exploration on the reasons for low efficiency of arable land protection policy in China: an evolutionary game theoretic model," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 26(10), pages 25173-25198, October.
    12. Sun, Bo & Fan, Boyang & Wu, Chun & Xie, Jingdong, 2024. "Exploring incentive mechanisms for the CCUS project in China's coal-fired power plants: An option-game approach," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 288(C).
    13. He, Yixiong & Zhang, Fengxuan & Wang, Yanwei, 2023. "How to facilitate efficient blue carbon trading? A simulation study using the game theory to find the optimal strategy for each participant," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 276(C).
    14. Shuai Nie & Guotian Cai & Yixuan Li & Yushu Chen & Ruxue Bai & Liping Gao & Xiaoyu Chen, 2022. "To Adopt CCU Technology or Not? An Evolutionary Game between Local Governments and Coal-Fired Power Plants," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(8), pages 1-18, April.
    15. Du, Qiang & Wang, Yalei & Pang, Qiaoyu & Hao, Tingting & Zhou, Yuqing, 2023. "The dynamic analysis on low-carbon building adoption under emission trading scheme," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 263(PC).
    16. Tan, Yiheng & Huang, Xiying & Li, Wei, 2023. "Does blockchain-based traceability system guarantee information authenticity? An evolutionary game approach," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 264(C).
    17. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
    18. Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    19. Jin, Tao & Jiang, Yulian & Liu, Xingwen, 2023. "Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of dynamic dual credit policy on new energy vehicles after subsidy cancellation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 440(C).
    20. Viossat, Yannick, 2008. "Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 27-43, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:energy:v:278:y:2023:i:c:s0360544223011362. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/energy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.