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Evolutionary Dynamics of Passive Housing Initiatives in New Rural Construction

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  • Yingrui Ma

    (College of Art and Design, Jilin Jianzhu University, Changchun 130118, China
    Faculty of Environmental Engineering, The University of Kitakyushu, Kitakyushu 808-0135, Japan)

  • Chao Wu

    (School of Economics and Management, Jilin Jianzhu University, Changchun 130118, China)

  • Xindong Wei

    (School of International Exchange, Jilin Jianzhu University, Changchun 130118, China)

  • Weijun Gao

    (Faculty of Environmental Engineering, The University of Kitakyushu, Kitakyushu 808-0135, Japan)

  • Lei Sun

    (School of Municipal and Environmental Engineering, Jilin Jianzhu University, Changchun 130118, China)

Abstract

In the context of China’s ambitious dual carbon goals, this study introduces an innovative reward–penalty incentive mechanism, grounded in evolutionary game theory, to develop a tripartite evolutionary game model concerning the construction of passive rural housing. This research meticulously analyzes the equilibrium and stability strategies of all involved parties and employs data simulation to examine the influence of varying parameters on the game dynamics. Our findings reveal that the government’s cost–benefit calculations significantly influence its decisions regarding passive housing initiatives. The study identifies optimal cost and benefit strategies for various developmental phases. Furthermore, the level of governmental rewards and penalties plays a crucial role in determining whether enterprises and farmers opt for passive housing solutions. The study establishes the efficacy of different incentive schemes at various stages. Importantly, the economic interests of enterprises and farmers are pivotal in their decision-making process regarding passive housing. The study advocates for a comprehensive set of measures to safeguard these interests, with a special emphasis on protecting farmers. In conclusion, this research offers substantial guidance for policy decisions aimed at transforming existing rural housing into passive housing, thereby aligning with China’s environmental and sustainability objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Yingrui Ma & Chao Wu & Xindong Wei & Weijun Gao & Lei Sun, 2024. "Evolutionary Dynamics of Passive Housing Initiatives in New Rural Construction," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(13), pages 1-20, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:13:p:5389-:d:1421658
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
    2. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1371-1399, November.
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