Exploration on the reasons for low efficiency of arable land protection policy in China: an evolutionary game theoretic model

The most stringent arable land protection system in China has not effectively prevented construction expansion from excessive occupation of arable land. In this paper, the evolutionary game theory is innovatively used to explore why arable land protection policies did not engender the desired outcomes from the perspective of multi-subject behavior. We first analyze the logic of arable land protection behavior of different participants, including the central government, local administrations and farmers. Then, a tripartite evolutionary game model is established to examine how behavioral interaction among subjects affects policy implementation. And parameter analysis is used to identify the influencing factors of subjects’ behavior. Our results show that: First, the ideal strategy combination of (0,1,1) for China's arable land protection cannot be achieved, which indicates that local administrations and farmers will not spontaneously protect arable land in the absence of central government’s supervision. Second, the policy effect in Shanghai has undergone a dynamic process from serious failure (2004–2013), mild failure (2013–2018) to effective control (after 2018). Local administrations and farmers are solely responsible for the deviation of policy implementation. Third, local administrations and farmers are more sensitive to the variations of arable land conversion income, political achievements and economic punishment. Thus, political and financial constraints should be imposed on them to promote the strict implementation of arable land protection policy. This paper enriches the existing study regarding arable land protection policy effect. And it is of great practical importance to regulate the subject’s behavior and facilitate policy implementation.