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Experience Rating and Work-Related Health and Safety

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  • Pascale Lengagne

Abstract

In the area of Workers Compensation Insurance schemes, experience rating (ER) is a common incentive tool, in many countries. Premiums paid by firms are experience rated, which should encourage them to improve working conditions and reduce work-related injuries and disabilities. Using sectorial data for industry and construction sectors in 2005, this article provides empirical insights into the influence of ER on work-related health and safety in the context of the French jurisdiction. We examine the relationship between firm premium rate variations and adverse working conditions indicators, controlling for observables, assuming the hypothesis of an asymmetric firm response to premium increases and decreases. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that ER is a lever to improve working conditions and reduce work-related injury rates. Further investigation is needed to understand the influence of ER on firm behavior. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Suggested Citation

  • Pascale Lengagne, 2016. "Experience Rating and Work-Related Health and Safety," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 69-97, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jlabre:v:37:y:2016:i:1:p:69-97
    DOI: 10.1007/s12122-015-9216-x
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    1. Kyyrä, Tomi & Paukkeri, Tuuli, 2018. "Does experience rating reduce sickness and disability claims? Evidence from policy kinks," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 178-192.
    2. Pierre, Aurélie & Jusot, Florence, 2017. "The likely effects of employer-mandated complementary health insurance on health coverage in France," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 321-328.
    3. Psacale Lengagne & Anissa Afrite, 2015. "Experience Rating, Incidence of Musculoskeletal Disorders and Related Absences.Results from a Natural Experiment," Working Papers DT69, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Jul 2015.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Workers’ compensation; Experience rating; Working conditions; Work-related injuries; J28; I13; I18;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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