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Corruption in Organizations: Some General Formulations and (In-)Corruptibility Results

Author

Listed:
  • Fang-Fang Tang

    (Peking University)

  • Yongsheng Xu

    (Georgia State University)

Abstract

In a classical social choice framework, this paper presents two formulations of the notion of corruption and examines their consequences for decision making in an organization. It is shown that any organization is corruptible if a minimal concept of corruption is used to diagnose corruptibility; however, if a more demanding concept of corruption is applied, there are organizations that are immune to such stronger forms of corruption. There are no constitutionally incorruptible organizational forms but weakly incorruptible constitutions can exist.

Suggested Citation

  • Fang-Fang Tang & Yongsheng Xu, 2021. "Corruption in Organizations: Some General Formulations and (In-)Corruptibility Results," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 49-57, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:homoec:v:38:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s41412-021-00112-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s41412-021-00112-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional economics; (In-)Corruptible selection functions/constitutions; Corruptibility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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