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Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities

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  • Hammond, Peter J

    (Department of Economics,and CAGE (Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy), University of Warwick,)

Abstract

Whether an economic agent's decision creates an externality often depends on the institutional context in which the decision was made. Indeed, in orthodox economics, a technological or exogenous externality occurs just in case one agent's economic welfare or production possibilities are directly affected by the market decisions of other agents. A pecuniary externality occurs just in case one consumer's economic welfare or producer's profit is affected indirectly by price changes caused by changes in other agents' decisions. Similarly, an institutional or endogenous externality may arise whenever allocations are determined by a mechanism that is not strategyproof for some agent. Then even a resource balance constraint creates an institutional externality except in special cases such as when no individual agent's action can affect market clearing prices - i.e., there are no pecuniary externalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Hammond, Peter J, 2018. "Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1162, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1162
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Externalities ; pecuniary externalities ; strategyproof mechanisms ; institutional externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

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