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On the propensity to settle or litigate in laboratory disputes

Author

Listed:
  • Matteo Migheli

    (University of Torino)

  • Margherita Saraceno

    (University of Pavia)

Abstract

This study experimentally investigates the role of the origin of victims' resources on the propensity to settle or litigate a dispute. The analysis focuses on victims’ decision to use a costly and uncertain procedure, that is, litigation, to recover money from offenders and on offenders’ decision to hand over what they have taken before litigation starts. The results suggest that although the share of offenders who return money increases once they learn that the victims have had to work to gain their resources, the threat of a costly dispute is stronger than any consideration about the origin of victims’ resources. In this study, the religiosity and gender of decision makers are included among the control variables because it is traditionally debated how these individual features are able to affect’ individuals’ attitudes in conflicts and their resolutions. In particular, gender seems to play a significant role since the main results are driven by female decision makers.

Suggested Citation

  • Matteo Migheli & Margherita Saraceno, 2023. "On the propensity to settle or litigate in laboratory disputes," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 40(2), pages 615-642, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:epolit:v:40:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s40888-022-00287-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s40888-022-00287-3
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Litigation; Sense of justice; Second-party-costly punishment; Laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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