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Forming beliefs about adjudicated outcomes: Perceptions of risk and reservation values

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  • Babcock, Linda
  • Farber, Henry S.
  • Fobian, Cynthia
  • Shafir, Eldar

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  • Babcock, Linda & Farber, Henry S. & Fobian, Cynthia & Shafir, Eldar, 1995. "Forming beliefs about adjudicated outcomes: Perceptions of risk and reservation values," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 289-303, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:3:p:289-303
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William M. Landes, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 164-214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Loewenstein, George & Issacharoff, Samuel & Camerer, Colin & Babcock, Linda, 1993. "Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 135-159, January.
    3. Babcock, Linda, et al, 1995. "Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1337-1343, December.
    4. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-1097, September.
    6. Fobian, Cynthia S. & Christensen-Szalanski, Jay J. J., 1993. "Ambiguity and Liability Negotiations: The Effects of the Negotiators' Role and the Sensitivity Zone," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 277-298, March.
    7. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    8. Thompson, Leigh & Loewenstein, George, 1992. "Egocentric interpretations of fairness and interpersonal conflict," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 176-197, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. David L. Dickinson & Ronald L. Oaxaca, 2009. "Statistical Discrimination in Labor Markets: An Experimental Analysis," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 76(1), pages 16-31, July.
    2. Landeo, Claudia M., 2009. "Cognitive coherence and tort reform," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 898-912, December.
    3. Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, 2023. "Biases in legal decision‐making: Comparing prosecutors, defense attorneys, law students, and laypersons," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(4), pages 852-894, December.
    4. Landeo, Claudia M., 2009. "Tort Reform, Disputes and Belief Formation," MPRA Paper 13453, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, 2010. "Revisiting the Debate over Attorneys' Contingent Fees: A Behavioral Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 245-288, January.
    6. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & M. Levati & Jianying Qiu, 2011. "Satisficing search versus aspiration adaptation in sales competition: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 179-198, February.
    7. Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, 2012. "Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 165-207.
    8. Matteo Migheli & Margherita Saraceno, 2023. "On the propensity to settle or litigate in laboratory disputes," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 40(2), pages 615-642, July.
    9. Powell, K. Skylar & Lim, Eunah, 2022. "All or nothing: International coalitions responding to competing pressures in challenges to IP rights," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(3).
    10. Hylton, Keith N., 2023. "Mutual optimism and risk preferences in litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    11. Mark Schweizer, 2013. "The civil standard of proof – what is it, actually?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

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