Private Games are too Dangerous
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009650500915
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Anatol Rapoport & Andreas Diekmann & Axel Franzen, 1995.
"Experiments with Social Traps IV,"
Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 431-441, October.
- Anatol Rapoport & Andreas Diekmann & Axel Franzen, 1995. "Experiments with Social Traps III," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(3), pages 328-337, July.
- Stanley, E. Ann & Ashlock, Dan & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1993.
"Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners,"
ISU General Staff Papers
199302010800001028, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, Daniel & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1994. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
- Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(Supplemen), pages 1073-1081.
- David Willer & John Skvoretz, 1997. "Games And Structures," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(1), pages 5-35, February.
- Merrill M. Flood, 1958. "Some Experimental Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(1), pages 5-26, October.
- Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
- Marc Knez & Colin Camerer, 1994. "Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in ‘Weakest‐Link’ Games," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(S1), pages 101-119, December.
- Ronald S. Burt & Marc Knez, 1995. "Kinds of Third-Party Effects on Trust," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(3), pages 255-292, July.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Rudolf Vetschera & D. Marc Kilgour, 2013. "Strategic Behavior in Contested-Pile Methods for Fair Division of Indivisible Items," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 299-319, March.
- Giampiero E.G. Beroggi, 2000. "Dynamic Plots in Virtual Negotiations," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 171-190, July.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Esther Hauk, "undated".
"Leaving the Prison: A Discussion of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under Preferential Partner Selection,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 1996
_067, Society for Computational Economics.
- Hauk, Esther, 1997. "Leaving the prison: A discussion of the Iterated prisoner`s dilemma under preferential partner selection," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6056, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.
- Nicolas Vallois & Dorian Jullien, 2017. "Estimating Rationality in Economics: A History of Statistical Methods in Experimental Economics," Working Papers halshs-01651070, HAL.
- Stringham, Edward Peter, 2011.
"Embracing morals in economics: The role of internal moral constraints in a market economy,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 98-109.
- Stringham, Edward Peter, 2011. "Embracing morals in economics: The role of internal moral constraints in a market economy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 98-109, April.
- Stringham, Edward, 2003. "The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth-century Amsterdam," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 321-344.
- Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2000.
"An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-19, January.
- Nicolaas J. Vriend, 1998. "An Illustration of the Essential Difference between Individual and Social Learning, and its Consequences for Computational Analyses," Working Papers 387, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Juliette Rouchier, 2013. "The Interest of Having Loyal Buyers in a Perishable Market," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 41(2), pages 151-170, February.
- Nicolas Vallois & Dorian Jullien, 2018.
"A history of statistical methods in experimental economics,"
The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(6), pages 1455-1492, November.
- Nicolas Vallois & Dorian Jullien, 2018. "A History of Statistical Methods in Experimental Economics," Post-Print halshs-01651070, HAL.
- Maoliang Ye & Jie Zheng & Plamen Nikolov & Sam Asher, 2020.
"One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 113-129, January.
- Sam Asher & Lorenzo Casaburi & Plamen Nikolov & Maoliang Ye, 2010. "One step at a time: Does gradualism build coordination?," Framed Field Experiments 00188, The Field Experiments Website.
- Maoliang Ye & Jie Zheng & Plamen Nikolov & Sam Asher, 2020. "One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?," Papers 2006.01386, arXiv.org.
- Ye, Maoliang & Zheng, Jie & Nikolov, Plamen & Asher, Samuel, 2019. "One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?," IZA Discussion Papers 12508, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Sam Asher & Lorenzo Casaburi & Plamen Nikolov, 2011. "One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?," Working Papers 1113, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
- Laurent Denant-Boemont & Olivier L’Haridon, 2013.
"La rationalité à l'épreuve de l'économie comportementale,"
Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 35-89.
- Laurent Denant-Boèmont & Olivier l'Haridon, 2013. "La rationalité à l’épreuve de l’économie comportementale," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201323, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Laurent Denant-Boèmont & Olivier L’haridon, 2013. "La rationalité à l'épreuve de l'économie comportementale," Post-Print halshs-00921070, HAL.
- Ashlock, Dan & Smucker, Mark & Stanley, E. Ann & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1994.
"Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma,"
ISU General Staff Papers
199409010700001033, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Ashlock, Daniel & Smucker, Mark D. & Stanley, E. Ann & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 1996. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1687, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Ashlock, Dan & Smucker, Mark & Stanley, E. Ann & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1996. "Preferential partner selection in an evolutionary study of Prisoner's Dilemma," ISU General Staff Papers 199601010800001033, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Dan Ashlock & Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Leigh Tesfatsion, 1995. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9501002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Jan 1995.
- Fahn, Matthias & MacLeod, W. Bentley & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2023. "Past and Future Developments in the Economics of Relational Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 16427, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Leonid Krasnozhon & John Levendis, 2018. "Weekend racer: cheating and self-governance in road racing," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 75-90, February.
- Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009.
"Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
- Powell, Benjamin & Stringham, Edward P., 2008. "Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Anarchy: A Survey," Working Papers 2008-7, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
- Powell, Benjamin & Stringham, Edward, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," MPRA Paper 26097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Serdarevic, Nina & Strømland, Eirik & Tjøtta, Sigve, 2018. "It Pays to be Nice: The Benefits of Cooperating in Markets," Working Papers in Economics 12/18, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Ray Reagans & Param Vir Singh & Ramayya Krishnan, 2015. "Forgotten Third Parties: Analyzing the Contingent Association Between Unshared Third Parties, Knowledge Overlap, and Knowledge Transfer Relationships with Outsiders," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(5), pages 1400-1414, October.
- Janssen, Marco A., 2008. "Evolution of cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma based on recognition of trustworthy and untrustworthy agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 458-471, March.
- Chad W. Seagren & David Skarbek, 2021. "The evolution of norms within a society of captives," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(3), pages 529-556, July.
- Ponti, Giovanni, 2000.
"Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 115-141, January.
- Giovanni Ponti, "undated". "Cycles Of Learning In The Centipede Game," ELSE working papers 024, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Giovanni Ponti, 1996. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Discussion Papers 96-22 ISSN 1350-6722, University College London, Department of Economics.
- Leeson, Peter T., 2005. "Endogenizing fractionalization," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 75-98, June.
More about this item
Keywords
trust; organization; social network; density; prisoner&2018; s dilemma;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:comaot:v:5:y:1999:i:4:d:10.1023_a:1009650500915. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.