Experiments with Social Traps III
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DOI: 10.1177/1043463195007003006
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- Anatol Rapoport & Andreas Diekmann & Axel Franzen, 1995. "Experiments with Social Traps IV," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 431-441, October.
References listed on IDEAS
- R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988.
"Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
- R. M. Isaac & J. M. Walker, 2010. "Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism," Levine's Working Paper Archive 310, David K. Levine.
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Cited by:
- Rense Corten & Stephanie Rosenkranz & Vincent Buskens & Karen S Cook, 2016. "Reputation Effects in Social Networks Do Not Promote Cooperation: An Experimental Test of the Raub & Weesie Model," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(7), pages 1-17, July.
- András Németh & Károly Takács, 2007. "The Evolution of Altruism in Spatially Structured Populations," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 10(3), pages 1-4.
- Sze‐Sze Wong & Wai Fong Boh & Anne Wu, 2021. "When Three’s (Good) Company: Third‐Party Friendships on Cooperation across Departments," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 389-420, March.
- Ronald S. Burt, 1999. "Private Games are too Dangerous," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 311-341, December.
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