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Experiments with Social Traps IV

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  • Anatol Rapoport

    (University of Toronto)

  • Andreas Diekmann

    (University of Bern, Switzerland)

  • Axel Franzen

    (University of Bern, Switzerland)

Abstract

In a long sequence of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma played by a pair of subjects, "lock-in " effects are frequently observed both on the CC and on the DD outcome. That is, in the course of the sequence either CC or DD becomes predominant sometimes persisting to the end. A lock-in on CC can be explained by a deterrence effect: The subjects learn that defection to D, although immediately advantageous if the co-player continues with C, is likely to be followed by retaliation. A lock-in on DD can be explained by the inhibition of unilateral C (the "peace initiative"), which is associated with the sucker's payoff In the present experiment, subjects played repeated round robin sequences of Prisoner's Dilemma with other subjects in their experimental group. Prominent lock-in effects were observed when the subjects were informed on each play how their current co-players chose when paired with other subjects but not when no such information was given.

Suggested Citation

  • Anatol Rapoport & Andreas Diekmann & Axel Franzen, 1995. "Experiments with Social Traps IV," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 431-441, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:7:y:1995:i:4:p:431-441
    DOI: 10.1177/104346319500700407
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    1. R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
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    2. András Németh & Károly Takács, 2007. "The Evolution of Altruism in Spatially Structured Populations," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 10(3), pages 1-4.
    3. Sze‐Sze Wong & Wai Fong Boh & Anne Wu, 2021. "When Three’s (Good) Company: Third‐Party Friendships on Cooperation across Departments," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 389-420, March.
    4. Ronald S. Burt, 1999. "Private Games are too Dangerous," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 311-341, December.

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