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Modeling Reputation Management System on Online C2C Market

Author

Listed:
  • Hitoshi Yamamoto

    (University of Electro-Communications)

  • Kazunari Ishida

    (Tokyo University of Agriculture)

  • Toshizumi Ohta

    (University of Electro-Communications)

Abstract

This paper discusses the effectiveness of sharing information concerning the reputations of buyers and sellers making online transactions in a consumer-to-consumer (C2C) market. We developed a computer simulation model that describes online transactions with a reputation management system that shares information concerning the reputations of consumers. The model takes an agent-based approach in which agents' actions are based on the iterated prisoner's dilemma. No model exists to analyze C2C markets even though there are many case studies concerning the effectiveness of sharing reputation information among participants in a market. The simulation results revealed that a positive reputation system can be more effective than a negative reputation system for an online transaction, even though the negative one can work for a traditional transaction. The result should be an important consideration when designing practical reputation management systems for online transactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Hitoshi Yamamoto & Kazunari Ishida & Toshizumi Ohta, 2004. "Modeling Reputation Management System on Online C2C Market," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 165-178, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:comaot:v:10:y:2004:i:2:d:10.1023_b:cmot.0000039169.05361.3d
    DOI: 10.1023/B:CMOT.0000039169.05361.3d
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carl Shapiro, 1982. "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 20-35, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anzhong Huang, 2018. "A risk detection system of e-commerce: researches based on soft information extracted by affective computing web texts," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 143-157, March.
    2. Ming-Qiang Huang & Rui-Juan Lin, 2022. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Energy-Saving Renovations of Existing Rural Residential Buildings from the Perspective of Stakeholders," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-20, May.
    3. M. R. Vicente, 2015. "Determinants of C2C e-commerce: an empirical analysis of the use of online auction websites among Europeans," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(12), pages 978-981, August.
    4. Weltevreden, Jesse W.J. & Rotem-Mindali, Orit, 2009. "Mobility effects of b2c and c2c e-commerce in the Netherlands: a quantitative assessment," Journal of Transport Geography, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 83-92.
    5. Fujio Toriumi & Hitoshi Yamamoto & Isamu Okada, 2020. "A belief in rewards accelerates cooperation on consumer-generated media," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 19-31, April.

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