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Increasing Diversity in Telecommunications Ownership and Increasing Efficiency in Spectrum Auctions by Breaking the Link Between Capital Market Discrimination and FCC Spectrum Auction Outcomes

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  • Clarence Bush

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  • Clarence Bush, 2010. "Increasing Diversity in Telecommunications Ownership and Increasing Efficiency in Spectrum Auctions by Breaking the Link Between Capital Market Discrimination and FCC Spectrum Auction Outcomes," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 37(2), pages 131-152, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:blkpoe:v:37:y:2010:i:2:p:131-152
    DOI: 10.1007/s12114-009-9049-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & S. Viswanathan, 2005. "Financing Auction Bids," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 789-815, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. SaÄŸlam, YiÄŸit & Ho, Phuong & Daglish, Toby, 2012. "Auctioning the Digital Dividend: a Model for Spectrum," Working Paper Series 4129, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    2. Daglish, Toby & Sağlam, Yiğit & Ho, Phuong, 2017. "Auctioning the Digital Dividend: A model for spectrum auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 63-98.
    3. Sağlam, Yiğit & Ho, Phuong & Daglish, Toby, 2012. "Auctioning the Digital Dividend: a Model for Spectrum," Working Paper Series 19238, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    4. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19238 is not listed on IDEAS

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