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Auctioning the Digital Dividend: a Model for Spectrum

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  • Sağlam, Yiğit
  • Ho, Phuong
  • Daglish, Toby

Abstract

This paper models a spectrum auction as a multi-unit auction where participantsuse the goods purchased to participate in a constrained multi-good downstream market. We use dynamic programming techniques to solve for the optimal bidding strategy for firms in a clock auction. Firms often value constraining competitor market power highly and inefficient firms will often bid aggressively to minimise competition. Regulators concerned with revenue maximisation have strong incentives to encourage this behaviour capping more efficient firms or capping entrants to the market. In contrast social welfare concerns suggest that allocating spectrum may be more efficient than using an auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Sağlam, Yiğit & Ho, Phuong & Daglish, Toby, 2012. "Auctioning the Digital Dividend: a Model for Spectrum," Working Paper Series 19238, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  • Handle: RePEc:vuw:vuwcsr:19238
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    File URL: https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/19238
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, September.
    2. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
    3. Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2003. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1557-1569, December.
    4. Cramton, Peter, 1998. "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 727-736, October.
    5. Clarence Bush, 2010. "Increasing Diversity in Telecommunications Ownership and Increasing Efficiency in Spectrum Auctions by Breaking the Link Between Capital Market Discrimination and FCC Spectrum Auction Outcomes," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 37(2), pages 131-152, June.
    6. Ali Hortaçsu & David McAdams, 2010. "Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 833-865.
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