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Security-Induced Lock-In in the Cloud

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  • Daniel Arce

    (University of Texas at Dallas)

Abstract

Cloud services providers practice security-induced lock-in when employing cryptography and tamper-resistance to limit the portability and interoperability of users’ data and applications. Moreover, security-induced lock-in and users’ anti-lock-in strategies intersect within the context of platform competition. When users deploy anti-lock in strategies, such as using a hybrid cloud, a leader–follower pricing framework increases profits for cloud services providers relative to Nash equilibrium prices. This creates a second-mover advantage, as the follower’s increase in profits exceeds that of the leader owing to the potential for price undercutting. By contrast, introducing or enhancing security-induced lock-in creates both an increase in profits and a first-mover advantage. Cloud services providers therefore favor security-induced lock-in over price leadership. More broadly, we show why standardization of semantics, technologies, and interfaces is a nonstarter for cloud services providers.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Arce, 2022. "Security-Induced Lock-In in the Cloud," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 64(4), pages 501-513, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:binfse:v:64:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s12599-021-00729-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s12599-021-00729-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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