Pavement rehabilitation scheduling and toll pricing under different regulatory regimes

This paper addresses the highway pavement rehabilitation scheduling and toll pricing issues over a planning horizon. In the highway system concerned, two types of agents are considered, namely highway operator and road users. Two models, which account for different highway regulatory regimes (i.e. public and private), are proposed. In the public regulatory model, the government aims to maximize total discounted social welfare of the transportation system over the planning horizon by determining the optimal pavement rehabilitation schedule and toll level. In the private regulatory regime, a profit-driven private operator seeks to optimize the pavement rehabilitation schedule and toll level to maximize its own discounted net profit over the planning horizon. The proposed models treat the interactions between the highway operator and the road users in the system as a bi-level hierarchical problem in which the upper level is a multi-period pavement rehabilitation scheduling and toll pricing problem, while the lower level is a multi-period route choice equilibrium problem. A heuristic solution algorithm that combines a greedy approach and a sensitivity analysis based approach is developed to solve the proposed bi-level multi-period optimization models. An illustrative example is used to show the applications of the proposed models. The findings show that the highway regulatory regime, pavement deterioration parameter and the roughness-induced vehicle operating cost can significantly affect the pavement rehabilitation schedules and the toll level as well as the performance of transportation system in terms of total life-cycle travel demand, net profit and social welfare. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014