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Economic and political competition in neoclassical and evolutionary perspective

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  • Michael Wohlgemuth

Abstract

Neoclassical welfare economics still looms large in the discipline of public choice. Particularly, by constructing analogies of political competition fundamental shortcomings of “old” neoclassical paradigms found their way into a “new” theory of political economy. Especially the failure to deal with the problem of limited knowledge and with the role of institutions obscured fundamental differences between political and economic systems of coordination and control. Hence, I propose a non-neoclassical perspective, using Hayekian concepts like “competition as a discovery procedure” or “spontaneous order” to develop an alternative agenda for many fields of public choice. I shall first outline a critique of neoclassical equilibrium settings in economics and in similarly constructed models of democracy. Then various properties of economic and political institutions, the competition of ideas and institutional competition among jurisdictions will be discussed in an evolutionary perspective. Not surprisingly, these applications reveal some similarities to central themes of constitutional political economy. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Wohlgemuth, 1995. "Economic and political competition in neoclassical and evolutionary perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 71-96, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:6:y:1995:i:1:p:71-96
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01298377
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    Cited by:

    1. Beata Cialowicz, 2024. "Formal Modeling of Innovative Competition in a Production System — an Evolutionary Approach," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(2), pages 7455-7474, June.
    2. Gerold Ambrosius, 2004. "Regulierungswettbewerb im Deutschen Reich (1871–1914): Welche Erfahrungen sind für die Europäische Union relevant?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(1), pages 39-57, February.
    3. Knoll Bodo & Koenig Andreas, 2011. "Leviathan Europa – Stärkung der Nationalstaaten und der EU durch konstitutionelle Schranken?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 60(2), pages 127-145, August.
    4. Peter K. Hazlett & Chandler S. Reilly, 2023. "Bureaucratic rent creation: the case of price discrimination in the market for postsecondary education," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 226-256, June.
    5. Wohlgemuth Michael, 1995. "Institutional Competition. Notes on an Unfinished Agenda," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 277-300, June.
    6. François Facchini, 2008. "L’invention des institutions de la liberté en Europe : fragmentation politique, fragmentation géographique et religion," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01395634, HAL.
    7. Anthony Evans, 2014. "A subjectivist’s solution to the limits of public choice," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 23-44, March.
    8. Streit Manfred E., 1998. "Competition Among Systems, Harmonisation and Integration," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2-3), pages 239-254, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    A12; D70; B41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology

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