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The Allocation of Police Protection By Income Class

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  • John C. Weicher

    (Ohio State University)

Abstract

Almost a decade ago Aaron Director proposed a law of public expenditures: Public expenditures are made for the primary benefit of the middle classes, and financed with taxes which are borne in considerable part by the poor and the rich.... Fire and police activities, for example, are clearly middle-income oriented to the extent that they protect property, and it would be interesting to investigate the extent to which such activities are provided more liberally in middle than in lower income areas of cities.

Suggested Citation

  • John C. Weicher, 1971. "The Allocation of Police Protection By Income Class," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 8(3), pages 207-220, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:urbstu:v:8:y:1971:i:3:p:207-220
    DOI: 10.1080/00420987120080411
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stigler, George J, 1970. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Meltzer, Rachel, 2011. "“Clean and Safe” for All? The Interaction Betweeen Business Improvement Districts and Local Government in the Provision of Public Goods," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 64(3), pages 863-889, September.

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