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El futuro de los pactos fiscales en América Latina

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  • Lora, Eduardo

Abstract

El éxito de un pacto fiscal se mide por el grado en que incorpore a los diversos grupos sociales en las discusiones, el cumplimiento y la vigilancia de ciertos acuerdos sobre la forma como se financia el Estado y se utilizan los recursos públicos. Partiendo de los factores políticos que pueden explicar las estructuras fiscales de América Latina, este artículo muestra la necesidad de alcanzar pactos fiscales, discute los incentivos que influyen en su viabilidad y propone prioridades de política fiscal y de reforma institucional para mejorar sus posibilidades de éxito.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Lora, Eduardo, 2008. "El futuro de los pactos fiscales en América Latina," Coediciones, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 1310.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecr:col013:1310
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean

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