Individual Competence and Committee Decision Making: Experimental Evidence
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DOI: 10.1002/soej.12424
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Cited by:
- Gregory DeAngelo & Bryan C. McCannon, 2022. "Behavioral economics and public choice: introduction to a special issue," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 285-292, June.
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