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Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games

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  • RICHARD JANKOWSKI

    (University of Arizona)

Abstract

Iterated playing of noncooperative games can result in full cooperation. Repeated playing of the noncooperative game permits the sucker to punish the initial defector by defecting in subsequent plays. This article shows that many n- person prisoner's dilemma (PD) games have chicken games embedded within them. In addition, positive externalities produce embedded chicken games, as physical coercion does when used to punish defectors. This characteristic has substantial implications for various solutions to iterated PD games. The difficulty encountered in chicken games is that the sucker must punish oneself in order to punish the defector. It is shown that various versions of the folk theorem, such as those by Friedman, Fudenberg and Maskin, and Abreu, do not extend to the chicken games under a number of realistic assumptions. Hence iterated playing by rational, self-interested actors will not result in cooperative behavior. What is needed to induce cooperative solutions is the presence of vengeful personalities who induce the evolution of metanorms.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Jankowski, 1990. "Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(4), pages 449-470, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:449-470
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463190002004004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    2. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. R. Isaac & David Schmidtz & James Walker, 1989. "The assurance problem in a laboratory market," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 217-236, September.
    5. Axelrod, Robert, 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1095-1111, December.
    6. Bianco, William T. & Bates, Robert H., 1990. "Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 133-147, March.
    7. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    8. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Jankowski, 1991. "Nash Versus Evolutionary Equilibria and the Folk Theorem," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(3), pages 386-389, July.
    2. M. A. Pisauro & E. F. Fouragnan & D. H. Arabadzhiyska & M. A. J. Apps & M. G. Philiastides, 2022. "Neural implementation of computational mechanisms underlying the continuous trade-off between cooperation and competition," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 13(1), pages 1-18, December.
    3. Douglas D. Heckathorn, 1998. "Collective Action, Social Dilemmas And Ideology," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(4), pages 451-479, November.
    4. Trudi C. Miller, 1992. "The Implications of Self-Interest," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 395-412, October.

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