Tolerance, Cooperation, and Equilibrium Restoration in Repeated Games
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008.
"The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & Eric S. Maskin, 1990.
"Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(4), pages 555-573.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Scholarly Articles 3226950, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin, 1998. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 608, David K. Levine.
- Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
- Ehud Lehrer & Ady Pauzner, 1999. "Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 393-412, March.
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Romeo Balanquit, 2013. "Stable Commitment in an Intertemporal Collusive Trade," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201301, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994.
"The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-948, July.
- Abreu, D. & Dutta, P.K. & Smith, L., 1992. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Working papers 92-15, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Dilip Abreu & Prajit K Dutta & Lones Smith, 1997. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 633, David K. Levine.
- Chari V. V. & Kehoe Patrick J., 1993.
"Sustainable Plans and Debt,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 230-261, December.
- V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans and debt," Staff Report 125, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005.
"Managerial incentives and collusive behavior,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1501-1523, August.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2004. "Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behaviour," CEPR Discussion Papers 4506, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine.
- Matthias Blonski & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015.
"Prisoners’ other Dilemma,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 61-81, February.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Blonski, Matthias, 2001. "Prisoners' Other Dilemma," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 437, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 04 Aug 2001.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Blonski, Matthias, 2003. "Prisoners' Other Dilemma," CEPR Discussion Papers 3856, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andersson, Ola, 2006. "Bargaining in Collusive Markets," Working Papers 2006:21, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2012. "Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 264-286, December.
- Kimmo Berg & Mitri Kitti, 2013. "Computing Equilibria in Discounted 2 × 2 Supergames," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 41(1), pages 71-88, January.
- Can, Burak, 2014.
"Weighted distances between preferences,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 109-115.
- Can, B., 2012. "Weighted distances between preferences," Research Memorandum 056, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- van Veelen, Matthijs & García, Julián, 2019.
"In and out of equilibrium II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 113-130.
- Matthijs van Veelen & Julian Garcia, 2012. "In and out of Equilibrium II: Evolution in Repeated Games with Discounting and Complexity Costs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-089/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Luca Lambertini, 2000.
"Technology and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation,"
German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(4), pages 421-442, November.
- Lambertini Luca, 2000. "Technology and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 1(4), pages 421-442, December.
- Matthijs van Veelen, 2007. "Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-115/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2017. "A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 185-198.
- Olivier GOSSNER, 2020. "The Robustness of Incomplete Penal Codes in Repeated Interactions," Working Papers 2020-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Robles Jack, 2011. "Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, April.
- Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2020. "Myopic perception in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-14.
- Seth Frey & Robert L. Goldstone, 2018. "Cognitive mechanisms for human flocking dynamics," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 349-375, September.
- Richard Jankowski, 1990. "Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(4), pages 449-470, October.
- Pablo Hernandez-Lagos & Dylan Minor & Dana Sisak, 2017.
"Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(4), pages 809-835, December.
- Pablo Hernandez & Dylan Minor & Dana Sisak, 2015. "Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-040, Harvard Business School.
- Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
More about this item
Keywords
infinitely-repeated games; tolerant trigger strategy;JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2010-04-17 (Game Theory)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:21877. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.