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Collective Decision-Making Models Applied To Labor Negotiations In The Netherlands: A Comparison Between An Exchange Model And A Conflict Model

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  • Maurice Rojer

Abstract

In this article two models of collective decision making, i.e. the Exchange of Voting Positions Model of Stokman and van Oosten and the Expected Utility Model of Bueno de Mesquita, are applied to the practice of labor negotiations in the Netherlands. The purpose of the study is to test the explanatory power of both models with regard to actual labor negotiation processes. Based on data regarding three variables, preferred outcomes, salience, and potential power, the models can simulate a process of collective decision making in a multilateral setting and with respect to a multi-issue agenda. The simulated process leads to predicted outcomes which will be compared with the actual outcomes after the actual negotiations have taken place. With the help of statistical tests regarding the predictive accuracy of the models, an answer will be given to the question of whether one or both of the models can give an adequate explanation of the outcomes of labor negotiation processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Maurice Rojer, 1999. "Collective Decision-Making Models Applied To Labor Negotiations In The Netherlands: A Comparison Between An Exchange Model And A Conflict Model," Rationality and Society, , vol. 11(2), pages 207-235, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:207-235
    DOI: 10.1177/104346399011002005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, 1990. "Multilateral negotiations: a spatial analysis of the Arab–Israeli dispute," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 317-340, July.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 2004. "Decision-Making Models, Rigor and New Puzzles," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 125-138, March.
    2. Javier Arregui & Frans Stokman & Robert Thomson, 2004. "Bargaining in the European Union and Shifts in Actors’ Policy Positions," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 47-72, March.
    3. T E van der Lei & W A H Thissen, 2009. "Quantitative problem structuring methods for multi-actor problems: an analysis of reported applications," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 60(9), pages 1198-1206, September.
    4. René Torenvlied & Robert Thomson, 2003. "Is Implementation Distinct from Political Bargaining?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(1), pages 64-84, February.
    5. Marjolein Achterkamp, 2002. "Challenge Versus Exchange in Collective Decision Making: A Comparison of Two Simulation Models Based on Simulated Data," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 171-196, October.

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