IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ratsoc/v11y1999i2p207-235.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Collective Decision-Making Models Applied To Labor Negotiations In The Netherlands: A Comparison Between An Exchange Model And A Conflict Model

Author

Listed:
  • Maurice Rojer

Abstract

In this article two models of collective decision making, i.e. the Exchange of Voting Positions Model of Stokman and van Oosten and the Expected Utility Model of Bueno de Mesquita, are applied to the practice of labor negotiations in the Netherlands. The purpose of the study is to test the explanatory power of both models with regard to actual labor negotiation processes. Based on data regarding three variables, preferred outcomes, salience, and potential power, the models can simulate a process of collective decision making in a multilateral setting and with respect to a multi-issue agenda. The simulated process leads to predicted outcomes which will be compared with the actual outcomes after the actual negotiations have taken place. With the help of statistical tests regarding the predictive accuracy of the models, an answer will be given to the question of whether one or both of the models can give an adequate explanation of the outcomes of labor negotiation processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Maurice Rojer, 1999. "Collective Decision-Making Models Applied To Labor Negotiations In The Netherlands: A Comparison Between An Exchange Model And A Conflict Model," Rationality and Society, , vol. 11(2), pages 207-235, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:207-235
    DOI: 10.1177/104346399011002005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/104346399011002005
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/104346399011002005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, 1990. "Multilateral negotiations: a spatial analysis of the Arab–Israeli dispute," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 317-340, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 2004. "Decision-Making Models, Rigor and New Puzzles," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 125-138, March.
    2. Javier Arregui & Frans Stokman & Robert Thomson, 2004. "Bargaining in the European Union and Shifts in Actors’ Policy Positions," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 47-72, March.
    3. T E van der Lei & W A H Thissen, 2009. "Quantitative problem structuring methods for multi-actor problems: an analysis of reported applications," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 60(9), pages 1198-1206, September.
    4. René Torenvlied & Robert Thomson, 2003. "Is Implementation Distinct from Political Bargaining?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(1), pages 64-84, February.
    5. Marjolein Achterkamp, 2002. "Challenge Versus Exchange in Collective Decision Making: A Comparison of Two Simulation Models Based on Simulated Data," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 171-196, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Guth, Werner & Ritzberger, Klaus & van Damme, Eric, 2004. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 697-713, June.
    2. Volodymyr Babich & Simone Marinesi & Gerry Tsoukalas, 2021. "Does Crowdfunding Benefit Entrepreneurs and Venture Capital Investors?," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(2), pages 508-524, March.
    3. Ley, Eduardo, 2006. "Statistical inference as a bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 142-149, October.
    4. Yu, Shasha & Lei, Ming & Deng, Honghui, 2023. "Evaluation to fixed-sum-outputs DMUs by non-oriented equilibrium efficient frontier DEA approach with Nash bargaining-based selection," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    5. Yashiv, Eran, 2007. "Labor search and matching in macroeconomics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 1859-1895, November.
    6. Iraklis Kollias & John Leventides & Vassilios G. Papavassiliou, 2024. "On the solution of games with arbitrary payoffs: An application to an over‐the‐counter financial market," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2), pages 1877-1895, April.
    7. Takeuchi, Ai & Veszteg, Róbert F. & Kamijo, Yoshio & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2022. "Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 169-198.
    8. Lili Liu & Guochun Tang & Baoqiang Fan & Xingpeng Wang, 2015. "Two-person cooperative games on scheduling problems in outpatient pharmacy dispensing process," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 938-948, November.
    9. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Rey-Bellet, Luc, 2021. "Positive feedback in coordination games: Stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 355-373.
    10. Vesa Kanniainen & Juha-Matti Lehtonen, 2019. "Offset Contracts as an Insurance Device in Building the National Security," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(1), pages 85-97, January.
    11. Eric van Damme & Xu Lang, 2022. "Two-Person Bargaining when the Disagreement Point is Private Information," Papers 2211.06830, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    12. Cédric Wanko, 2008. "Approche Conceptuelle et Algorithmique des Equilibres de Nash Robustes Incitatifs," Working Papers 08-03, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2008.
    13. Jacob Engwerda & Davoud Mahmoudinia & Rahim Dalali Isfahani, 2016. "Government and Central Bank Interaction under Uncertainty: A Differential Games Approach," Iranian Economic Review (IER), Faculty of Economics,University of Tehran.Tehran,Iran, vol. 20(2), pages 225-259, Spring.
    14. R. Harrison Wagner, 1979. "On The Unification of Two-Person Bargaining Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(1), pages 71-101, March.
    15. Eran Hanany & D. Marc Kilgour & Yigal Gerchak, 2007. "Final-Offer Arbitration and Risk Aversion in Bargaining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(11), pages 1785-1792, November.
    16. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Pre-bargaining Investment Implies a Pareto Ranking of Bargaining Solutions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 769-787, August.
    17. Walter Trockel, 2015. "Axiomatization of the discrete Raiffa solution," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(1), pages 9-17, April.
    18. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1988. "Verhandlungssysteme, Verteilungskonflikte und Pathologien der politischen Steuerung," MPIfG Discussion Paper 88/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    19. Feltovich, Nick & Swierzbinski, Joe, 2011. "The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 554-574, May.
    20. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Individual learning and social rationality1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 651-663, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:207-235. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.