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Local Government Compliance with Earmarked Tax Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Calvin Blackwell
  • John C. Crotts
  • Stephen W. Litvin
  • Alan K. Styles

    (College of Charleston, South Carolina)

Abstract

This article investigates local governments’ spending of accommodations tax revenues in the state of South Carolina. Although these revenues are partially earmarked for tourism promotion, results show that local governments engage in illegal fiscal substitution. This fiscal substitution can be explained by the local government's financial flexibility and the proportion of accommodations taxes relative to its overall budget.

Suggested Citation

  • Calvin Blackwell & John C. Crotts & Stephen W. Litvin & Alan K. Styles, 2006. "Local Government Compliance with Earmarked Tax Regulation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 34(2), pages 212-228, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:34:y:2006:i:2:p:212-228
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142105284213
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Margaret Wilkinson, 1994. "Paying for public spending: is there a role for earmarked taxes?," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 119-135, November.
    2. Bos, Dieter, 2000. "Earmarked taxation: welfare versus political support," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 439-462, March.
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    8. Dhillon, Amrita & Perroni, Carlo, 2001. "Tax earmarking and grass-roots accountability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 99-106, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jongmin Shon, 2022. "Does Competition Tame the Leviathan? A Case of Earmarked Spending for Transportation," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 241(2), pages 59-78, June.
    2. Whitney B. Afonso, 2017. "State LST Laws: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Laws Governing Local Sales Taxes," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(4), pages 25-46, December.
    3. Whitney B. Afonso, 2015. "Leviathan or Flypaper: Examining the Fungibility of Earmarked Local Sales Taxes for Transportation," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 1-23, September.

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