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Tax earmarking, party politics and gubernatorial veto: theory and evidence from US states

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  • Jeremy Jackson

Abstract

This paper provides a theory of earmarking based on the relative power of a legislature and executive. The politically powerful use earmarking as a means of resolving uncertainty and insulating preferred policy from the reach of future government. Tax revenue will be earmarked more often when political power is unified under one party or when a party has the legislative majority needed to overturn a gubernatorial veto. An empirical test of the theoretical predictions are conducted using a panel of data for US states. A state with a legislature controlled by a single party with a large enough majority to overturn a gubernatorial veto will earmark 5% more of its tax revenue than other states and a state with a unified government will earmark 6.5% more. Together these explain 18.5% of the observed decrease in the percentage of state tax revenues earmarked from 1954 to 1997. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

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  • Jeremy Jackson, 2013. "Tax earmarking, party politics and gubernatorial veto: theory and evidence from US states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 1-18, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:1:p:1-18
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9822-y
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Earmarking; Veto; Spatial autocorrelation; Separation of powers; D72; D78; H41; H71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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