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The Separation of Spending from Taxation: Implications for Collective Choices

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  • Michael Marlow
  • William Orzechowski

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  • Michael Marlow & William Orzechowski, 1997. "The Separation of Spending from Taxation: Implications for Collective Choices," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 151-163, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:8:y:1997:i:2:p:151-163
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1009016509573
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hettich, Walter & Winer, Stanley, 1984. "A positive model of tax structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 67-87, June.
    2. Howard R. Bowen, 1943. "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 58(1), pages 27-48.
    3. Michael Marlow, 1992. "Intergovernmental competition, voice and exit options and the design of fiscal structure," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 73-88, December.
    4. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Collective Choice and General Fund Financing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 377-390, April.
    5. Richard Wagner, 1988. "The Calculus of consent: A Wicksellian retrospective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 153-166, February.
    6. Orzechowski, William, 1991. "Reaganomics and the Use of Collective Rebates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 311-322, March.
    7. William Hunter & Michael Nelson, 1989. "Interest group demand for taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 41-61, July.
    8. Frohlich, Norman & Oppenheimer, Joe, 1990. "Redistributive Politics: A Theory of Taxation for an Incumbent in a Democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 135-153, February.
    9. James M. Buchanan, 1963. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(5), pages 457-457.
    10. Michael Marlow & William Orzechowski, 1988. "Controlling leviathan through tax reduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 237-245, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard E. Wagner, 2012. "Deficits, Debt, and Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14477.
    2. Franz Xavier Barrios Suvelza, 2005. "Efectos de espacio sobre costos de provisión local. Un modelo de ecualización por bloques para los municipios bolivianos," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 7(13), pages 193-225, July-Dece.
    3. Jody W. Lipford, 2022. "The Distribution of Transfers and Taxes: Incentives and Implications for the US Deficit and Debt," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 37(Winter 20), pages 1-20.

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