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4. Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems

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  • Lisa L. Martin

Abstract

Like individuals facing common-pool resource problems, states search for ways to solve collective-action problems in the international system without turning to external enforcement. Heterogeneity of power and of preference intensities may enhance the probability of cooperation, if states are able to link issues credibly. International decision-making rules that require more than majority support will also increase the demand for issue linkage. Credible issue linkages are facilitated by stringent domestic ratification rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa L. Martin, 1994. "4. Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 473-493, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:4:p:473-493
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006004004
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    Cited by:

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    2. Kjell Hausken & Thomas Plumper, 1998. "The impact of actor heterogeneity on the provision of international public goods," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(1), pages 61-94, August.
    3. Jan Beyers & Marcel Hanegraaff, 2017. "Balancing friends and foes: Explaining advocacy styles at global diplomatic conferences," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 461-484, September.

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