IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/revint/v13y2018i4d10.1007_s11558-017-9289-9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?

Author

Listed:
  • Christoph Mikulaschek

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

What explains the outcome of interstate negotiations in international organizations (IOs)? While existing research highlights member states’ power, preference intensity, and the IO’s institutional design, this paper introduces an additional source of bargaining power in IOs: Through issue linkage members of an IO leverage privileged positions in other IOs to obtain more favorable bargaining outcomes. Specifically, European Union members are more successful in bargaining over the EU budget while they hold a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Inside the UNSC EU members can promote security interests of other European countries, and they can use their influence to secure side-payments from the EU budget. The study tests this argument by investigating new EU budget data, and it shows that EU members obtain 1.7 billion Euro in additional net receipts during a two-year UNSC term, on average. Thus, bargaining processes in the EU and the UN are intricately linked.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Mikulaschek, 2018. "Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 491-518, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:13:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s11558-017-9289-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-017-9289-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11558-017-9289-9
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11558-017-9289-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. A. Colin Cameron & Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, 2008. "Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 414-427, August.
    2. Young, Oran R., 1989. "The politics of international regime formation: managing natural resources and the environment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 349-375, July.
    3. Moravcsik, Andrew, 1991. "Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(1), pages 19-56, January.
    4. Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen & James Vreeland, 2014. "The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 51-83, January.
    5. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
    6. Zeev Maoz, 2012. "How Network Analysis Can Inform the Study of International Relations," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(3), pages 247-256, July.
    7. Vreeland,James Raymond & Dreher,Axel, 2014. "The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521740067.
    8. Davis, Christina L., 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(1), pages 153-169, February.
    9. Allison Carnegie & Nikolay Marinov, 2017. "Foreign Aid, Human Rights, and Democracy Promotion: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(3), pages 671-683, July.
    10. Erik Voeten, 2014. "Does participation in international organizations increase cooperation?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 285-308, September.
    11. Voeten, Erik, 2000. "Clashes in the Assembly," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 185-215, April.
    12. Julia Morse & Robert Keohane, 2014. "Contested multilateralism," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 385-412, December.
    13. Sebenius, James K., 1983. "Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 281-316, April.
    14. James G. MacKinnon & Matthew D. Webb, 2017. "Wild Bootstrap Inference for Wildly Different Cluster Sizes," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(2), pages 233-254, March.
    15. Vincenzo Bove & Leandro Elia, 2011. "Supplying peace: Participation in and troop contribution to peacekeeping missions," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 48(6), pages 699-714, November.
    16. Deniz Aksoy, 2010. "Who gets what, when, and how revisited: Voting and proposal powers in the allocation of the EU budget," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 171-194, June.
    17. Jonas Tallberg, 2008. "Bargaining Power in the European Council," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 685-708, June.
    18. Brian Lai & Vanessa A. Lefler, 2017. "Examining the role of region and elections on representation in the UN Security Council," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 585-611, December.
    19. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:46:y:2008:i::p:685-708 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. McKibben,Heather Elko, 2015. "State Strategies in International Bargaining," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107086098, September.
    21. Keohane, Robert O., 1986. "Reciprocity in international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 1-27, January.
    22. Voeten, Erik, 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(4), pages 845-858, December.
    23. Luke Keele & Corrine McConnaughy & Ismail White, 2012. "Strengthening the Experimenter’s Toolbox: Statistical Estimation of Internal Validity," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(2), pages 484-499, April.
    24. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
    25. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. & Kahler, Miles & Montgomery, Alexander H., 2009. "Network Analysis for International Relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 559-592, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zareh Asatryan & Annika Havlik, 2020. "The political economy of multilateral lending to European regions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 707-740, July.
    2. Christina L. Davis & Tyler Pratt, 2021. "The forces of attraction: How security interests shape membership in economic institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 903-929, October.
    3. Dreher, Axel & Lang, Valentin F. & Richert, Katharina, 2019. "The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 242-254.
    4. Merih Angin & Albana Shehaj & Adrian J. Shin, 2021. "Inside job: Migration and distributive politics in the European Union," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 264-288, July.
    5. Andreas Dür & Christoph Moser & Gabriele Spilker, 2020. "The political economy of the European Union," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 561-572, July.
    6. Bernhard Reinsberg, 2019. "Do countries use foreign aid to buy geopolitical influence?: Evidence from donor campaigns for temporary UN Security Council seats," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2019-4, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Daniel Verdier, 2022. "Bargaining strategies for governance complex games," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 349-371, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daniel Verdier, 2022. "Bargaining strategies for governance complex games," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 349-371, April.
    2. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2015. "Politics and IMF Conditionality," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 59(1), pages 120-148, February.
    3. Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen & James Vreeland, 2014. "The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 51-83, January.
    4. Brian Lai & Vanessa A. Lefler, 2017. "Examining the role of region and elections on representation in the UN Security Council," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 585-611, December.
    5. Maria Perrotta Berlin & Raj M. Desai & Anders Olofsgård, 2023. "Trading favors? UN Security Council membership and subnational favoritism in aid recipients," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 237-258, April.
    6. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(1), pages 157-191.
    7. Axel Dreher & Vera Eichenauer & Kai Gehring & Vera Z. Eichenauer, 2013. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 4299, CESifo.
    8. Erasmus Kersting & Christopher Kilby, 2019. "The rise of supplemental lending at the World Bank," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1655-1698, November.
    9. Dreher, Axel & Lang, Valentin F. & Richert, Katharina, 2019. "The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 242-254.
    10. Erik Voeten, 2014. "Does participation in international organizations increase cooperation?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 285-308, September.
    11. Hugo Oriola & Jamel Saadaoui, 2024. "How do geopolitical interests affect financial markets reaction to international institution projects?," Working Papers of BETA 2024-25, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    12. Julia C. Morse & Bridget Coggins, 2024. "Your silence speaks volumes: Weak states and strategic absence in the UN General Assembly," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 515-544, September.
    13. Angelika J. Budjan & Andreas Fuchs, 2021. "Democracy and Aid Donorship," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 217-238, November.
    14. Bernhard Reinsberg, 2019. "Do Countries Use Foreign Aid to Buy Geopolitical Influence? Evidence from Donor Campaigns for Temporary UN Security Council Seats," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 7(2), pages 127-154.
    15. Axel Dreher & Valentin F. Lang & B. Peter Rosendorff & James Raymond Vreeland, 2018. "Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis," CESifo Working Paper Series 7329, CESifo.
    16. Juan Duque & Michael Jetter & Santiago Sosa, 2015. "UN interventions: The role of geography," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 67-95, March.
    17. Axel Dreher & Sarah Langlotz & Silvia Marchesi, 2017. "Information Transmission And Ownership Consolidation In Aid Programs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1671-1688, October.
    18. Dreher, Axel & Mikosch, Heiner & Voigt, Stefan, 2015. "Membership has its Privileges – The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 346-358.
    19. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2019. "Foreign in influence and domestic policy: A survey," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1928, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    20. Erasmus Kersting & Christopher Kilby, 2021. "Do domestic politics shape U.S. influence in the World Bank?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 29-58, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; International organizations; Issue linkage; Intergovernmental bargaining; Budget allocation; European Union; United Nations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:13:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s11558-017-9289-9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.