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Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitment: Japan and the United States

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  • Cowhey, Peter F.

Abstract

The domestic politics of great powers significantly influence the fate of such multilateral regimes at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Unless great powers can make credible commitments to support those regimes, few countries will offer more than token support. Domestic political constraints may bind national leaders to good faith adherence to multilateral regimes even if international circumstances do not compel adherence. Domestic politics also influence the ability of other countries to monitor national adherence to agreements. Case studies of U.S. and Japanese responses to multilateral regimes show how the nature of the national electoral system, the division of powers in the government, and the transparency of the national political system influence credibility and lead to special features of multilateral economic and security regimes.

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  • Cowhey, Peter F., 1993. "Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitment: Japan and the United States," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(2), pages 299-326, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:47:y:1993:i:02:p:299-326_02
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    Cited by:

    1. Chin, Lee & Che Rusli, AK, 2015. "The Determinants of Non-Tariff Barriers: The Role of WTO Membership," MPRA Paper 96864, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bryan Ritchie, 2009. "Economic upgrading in a state-coordinated, liberal market economy," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 435-457, September.
    3. Brett Ashley Leeds, 2000. "Credible Commitments and International Cooperation: Guaranteeing Contracts Without External Enforcement," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 18(1), pages 49-71, February.
    4. David Lake, 2009. "Open economy politics: A critical review," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 219-244, September.
    5. Xinyuan Dai, 2006. "The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(5), pages 690-713, October.
    6. Jeffry A. Frieden & David A. Lake, 2005. "International Relations as a Social Science: Rigor and Relevance," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 600(1), pages 136-156, July.
    7. Benjamin A. T. Graham & Noel P. Johnston & Allison F. Kingsley, 2018. "Even Constrained Governments Take," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(8), pages 1784-1813, September.
    8. Bertoni, Fabio & Lugo, Stefano, 2014. "The effect of sovereign wealth funds on the credit risk of their portfolio companies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 21-35.
    9. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Is Japan Special? Monetary Linkages and Price Stability," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 15(2), pages 63-79, December.
    10. Brian Lai & Dan Reiter, 2000. "Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(2), pages 203-227, April.
    11. Lisa L. Martin, 1994. "4. Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 473-493, October.

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