National Emergency and the Erosion of Private Property Rights
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References listed on IDEAS
- Alston, Lee J, 1984. "Farm Foreclosure Moratorium Legislation: A Lesson from the Past," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 445-457, June.
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- Melvin J. Hinich & Michael C. Munger, 1992. "A Spatial Theory of Ideology," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 5-30, January.
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JEL classification:
- R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
- Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General
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