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Security in the absence of a state: Traditional authority, livestock trading, and maritime piracy in northern Somalia

Author

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  • Avidit Acharya

    (Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA)

  • Robin Harding

    (University of Oxford, Oxford, UK)

  • J. Andrew Harris

    (New York University Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates)

Abstract

Without a strong state, how do institutions emerge to limit the impact of one group’s predation on another’s economic activities? Motivated by the case of northern Somalia, we develop a model that highlights the monitoring challenges that groups face in making cooperation self-enforcing, and two key factors that influence their likelihood of overcoming this challenge: the ratio of economic interests across productive and predatory sectors, and the existence of informal income-sharing institutions. Our model explains why conflicts between pirates and livestock traders can be resolved in the region of Somaliland, where the ratio of economic interests favors the productive sector and traditional institutions promote income sharing between groups, but not in the region of Puntland, where these conditions do not hold. The model also accounts for several of the empirical patterns in the relationships between piracy, livestock exports, and conflict in both regions.

Suggested Citation

  • Avidit Acharya & Robin Harding & J. Andrew Harris, 2020. "Security in the absence of a state: Traditional authority, livestock trading, and maritime piracy in northern Somalia," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 497-537, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:32:y:2020:i:4:p:497-537
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629820941110
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Victor Razuri-Esteves, 2022. "Percepction of Piracy and Armed Robbery in Bahía del Callao – Perú," Journal of Transportation Security, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 161-172, December.

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