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Structure, Indeterminacy and Chaos

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  • Robert Huckfeldt

Abstract

This paper re-examines the relationship between structural explanations and indeterminacy within the context of chaos and chaotic processes. The analysis demonstrates that the logic of a wholly determinate structure is not incompatible with a complex, apparently indeterminate outcome. This fact has important consequences for explanation in the social sciences, and for the evaluation of indeterminacy in social and political processes. In particular, it suggests that indeterminacy is not necessarily a repudiation of structural explanations for social and political life because a determinate structure is fully capable of generating complex and even seemingly stochastic behavior. Thus, the central task of the social sciences is correctly seen as an identification of the structure and logic underlying social processes, including the logic and structure of indeterminacy.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Huckfeldt, 1990. "Structure, Indeterminacy and Chaos," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 413-433, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:413-433
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692890002004004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stokes, Donald E., 1966. "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 19-28, March.
    2. Huckfeldt, R. Robert, 1983. "The Social Context of Political Change: Durability, Volatility, and Social Influence," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(4), pages 929-944, December.
    3. Tsebelis, George, 1989. "The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 77-91, March.
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