IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/qualqt/v47y2013i3p1639-1655.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Using laboratory experiments to study law and crime

Author

Listed:
  • Christine Horne
  • Heiko Rauhut

Abstract

The 19th and 20th centuries produced breakthroughs in physics, chemistry, and the biological sciences. Laboratory research played an important role in the rapid advances made in these fields. Laboratory research can also contribute progress in the social sciences and, in particular, to law and criminology. To make this argument, we begin by discussing what laboratory experiments can and cannot do. We then provide three illustrations of lab experiments that have contributed to understanding of crime and law and discuss how these laboratory data complement those gained through other methods. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Christine Horne & Heiko Rauhut, 2013. "Using laboratory experiments to study law and crime," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 1639-1655, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:47:y:2013:i:3:p:1639-1655
    DOI: 10.1007/s11135-011-9617-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11135-011-9617-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11135-011-9617-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati & Pietro Vertova, 2009. "The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(2), pages 257-280, April.
    2. Ivar Krumpal & Heiko Rauhut & Dorothea Böhr & Elias Naumann, 2011. "The framing of risks and the communication of subjective probabilities for victimizations," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 45(6), pages 1331-1348, October.
    3. P.-A. Chiappori, 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1138-1151, September.
    4. George Tsebelis, 1990. "Penalty has no Impact on Crime:," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(3), pages 255-286, July.
    5. Heiko Rauhut, 2009. "Higher Punishment, Less Control?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 21(3), pages 359-392, August.
    6. Kessler, Daniel P & Levitt, Steven D, 1999. "Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 343-363, April.
    7. Lance Lochner, 2007. "Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 444-460, March.
    8. Tsebelis, George, 1989. "The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 77-91, March.
    9. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2003. "Professionals Play Minimax," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 395-415.
    10. Francesco Guala, 2002. "On the scope of experiments in economics: comments on Siakantaris," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 26(2), pages 261-267, March.
    11. Moschini, GianCarlo, 2004. "Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games: live play in soccer," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 365-371, December.
    12. Heiko Rauhut & Marcel Junker, 2009. "Punishment Deters Crime Because Humans Are Bounded in Their Strategic Decision-Making," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(3), pages 1-1.
    13. Shepherd, Joanna M, 2002. "Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California's Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 159-201, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel, 2016. "Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Massimiliano Giacalone & Maria Rosaria Giannuzzi & Demetrio Panarello, 2018. "DNA test to assess criminal responsibility: a Bayesian approach," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(6), pages 2837-2853, November.
    3. Heiko Rauhut, 2015. "Stronger inspection incentives, less crime? Further experimental evidence on inspection games," Rationality and Society, , vol. 27(4), pages 414-454, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christine Horne & Heiko Rauhut, "undated". "Using Laboratory Experiments to Study Law and Crime," Working Papers CCSS-10-010, ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design.
    2. Heiko Rauhut, 2015. "Stronger inspection incentives, less crime? Further experimental evidence on inspection games," Rationality and Society, , vol. 27(4), pages 414-454, November.
    3. Heiko Rauhut, 2009. "Higher Punishment, Less Control?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 21(3), pages 359-392, August.
    4. Heiko Rauhut & Marcel Junker, 2009. "Punishment Deters Crime Because Humans Are Bounded in Their Strategic Decision-Making," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(3), pages 1-1.
    5. Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, 2010. "The Deterrent Effect of Imprisonment," NBER Chapters, in: Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs, pages 43-94, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Susumu Shikano & Michael F Stoffel & Markus Tepe, 2017. "Information accuracy in legislative oversight: Theoretical implications and experimental evidence," Rationality and Society, , vol. 29(2), pages 226-254, May.
    7. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2013. "Testing Enforcement Strategies In The Field: Threat, Moral Appeal And Social Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 634-660, June.
    8. Luigi Buzzacchi & Stefano Pedrini, 2014. "Does player specialization predict player actions? Evidence from penalty kicks at FIFA World Cup and UEFA Euro Cup," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(10), pages 1067-1080, April.
    9. Giovanni Mastrobuoni & David A Rivers, 2019. "Optimising Criminal Behaviour and the Disutility of Prison," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(619), pages 1364-1399.
    10. Wolfgang Leininger & Axel Ockenfels, 2007. "The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?," Working Paper Series in Economics 34, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    11. Ofer Azar & Michael Bar-Eli, 2011. "Do soccer players play the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(25), pages 3591-3601.
    12. Johannes Rincke & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Deterrence Through Word of Mouth," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    13. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe & Michael Wedow, 2011. "General Ability and Specialization: Evidence From Penalty Kicks in Soccer," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(1), pages 81-105, February.
    14. Giancarlo Moschini, 2010. "Incentives And Outcomes In A Strategic Setting: The 3‐Points‐For‐A‐Win System In Soccer," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(1), pages 65-79, January.
    15. Patrick Groeber & Heiko Rauhut, 2010. "Does ignorance promote norm compliance?," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 1-28, March.
    16. Christoph Engel, 2016. "Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    17. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    18. Alain Cohn & Michel André Maréchal & Thomas Noll, 2015. "Bad Boys: How Criminal Identity Salience Affects Rule Violation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(4), pages 1289-1308.
    19. Miceli Thomas J., 2012. "Deterred or Detained? A Unified Model of Criminal Punishment," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, March.
    20. Anusua Datta, 2017. "California’s Three Strikes Law Revisited: Assessing the Long-Term Effects of the Law," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(2), pages 225-249, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:47:y:2013:i:3:p:1639-1655. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.