Bargaining with a biased autocrat

This paper presents a specific dynamic extension to the model outlined by Jackson and Morelli (Political bias and war. The American Economic Review 97(4): 1353–1373). In particular, we focus on the implications of a long-lived leader who possesses bias towards or against war that potentially differs from the country (s)he represents. Bargaining and war outcomes are characterized in this environment. We emphasize three results: (1) war sometimes occurs only after substantial delay; (2) if it is possible to select a leader, a country will always select a leader who is biased towards war; (3) when the distribution of power is uneven, a country might select an aggressive leader who eventually leads the country into war. If applied in the context of a civil war model, the third result implies that particularly disadvantaged rebel groups might select aggressive leaders to bargain with the central government and, potentially, incite conflict.