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The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important

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  • Keith L. Dougherty

    (University of Georgia, dougherk@uga.edu)

  • Julian Edward

    (Florida International University, edwardj@fiu.edu)

Abstract

Little attention has been paid to the differences between absolute majority rule and simple majority rule, which differ in their treatment of absences and ‘votes to abstain’. This article fills that gap by undertaking a probabilistic analysis of the two voting rules assuming two alternatives and a quorum requirement for simple majority rule. The rules are compared in both a modified sincere setting and a strategic setting using five criteria: (1) the Pareto criterion, (2) the BT criterion (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962), (3) the Expected Social Gain criterion, (4) the Responsiveness criterion, and (5) a modified version of Rae’s criterion. In the sincere setting, we find that simple majority rule (with and without a quorum) outperforms absolute majority rule under most conditions for four out of the five criteria. In the strategic setting, we find that the voting rules perform much more similarly.

Suggested Citation

  • Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2010. "The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(1), pages 85-122, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:22:y:2010:i:1:p:85-122
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629809347557
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Keith Dougherty & Julian Edward & Robi Ragan, 2015. "The value of formalism: re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 31-52, April.
    2. Freixas, Josep & Parker, Cameron, 2015. "Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 144-151.
    3. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2011. "Majorities with a quorum," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 241-259, April.
      • Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2010. "Majorities with a quorum," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    4. Alaitz Artabe & Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 15-28, March.
    5. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Quaternary dichotomous voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 431-454, March.
    6. Alaitz Artabe & Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 15-28, March.
      • Artabe Echevarria, Alaitz & Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2011. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    7. Keith L. Dougherty, 2015. "Supermajority rules," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 7, pages 102-116, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2010. "Quaternary dichotomous voting rules," IKERLANAK 2010-41, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    9. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2010. "Majorities with a quorum," IKERLANAK 2010-42, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.

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