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Supermajority rules

In: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

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  • Keith L. Dougherty

Abstract

This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.

Suggested Citation

  • Keith L. Dougherty, 2015. "Supermajority rules," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 7, pages 102-116, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15584_7
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781783470723.00013.xml
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Z. Spindler, 1990. "Constitutional design for a rent-seeking society: Voting rule choice," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 73-82, September.
    2. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, September.
    3. Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2011. "The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design," Studies in Public Choice, Springer, number 978-0-387-98171-0, December.
    4. Guttman, Joel M., 1998. "Unanimity and majority rule: the calculus of consent reconsidered," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 189-207, May.
    5. Brennan,Geoffrey & Hamlin,Alan, 2000. "Democratic Devices and Desires," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521639774.
    6. Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2010. "The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(1), pages 85-122, January.
    7. Keith Dougherty & Julian Edward & Robi Ragan, 2015. "The value of formalism: re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 31-52, April.
    8. Freixas, Josep & Zwicker, William S., 2009. "Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 428-444, November.
    9. Jac C. Heckelman & Keith L. Dougherty, 2010. "Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes," Public Finance Review, , vol. 38(6), pages 738-761, November.
    10. Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2004. "The Pareto Efficiency and Expected Costs of k-Majority Rules," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 3(2), pages 161-189, May.
    11. Avinash Dixit & Gene M. Grossman & Faruk Gul, 2000. "The Dynamics of Political Compromise," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 531-568, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
    2. Mathieu Martin & Zéphirin Nganmeni & Ashley Piggins & Élise F. Tchouante, 2022. "Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 301-316, March.

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