IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v34y2022i1p35-58.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Congressional oversight and electoral accountability

Author

Listed:
  • Austin Bussing

    (Department of Political Science, 4038Sam Houston State University)

  • Michael Pomirchy

    (Department of Politics, 6740Princeton University)

Abstract

Legislative oversight allows Congress to investigate potential wrongdoing by executive branch actors. We present a model in which an incumbent exercises oversight and chooses to take corrective action against the executive before going up for reelection. We show that partisan types who prefer to take corrective action regardless of the probability of wrongdoing will always conduct oversight, but sincere types who only want to correct legitimate wrongdoing will exercise restraint to avoid appearing too partisan and losing reelection. The model also shows that oversight is increasing in the probability that the incumbent is partisan and the probability that the challenger is sincere. Finally, we present two case studies, the Elián González custody case and the attack on the Benghazi embassy, to illustrate our theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Austin Bussing & Michael Pomirchy, 2022. "Congressional oversight and electoral accountability," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(1), pages 35-58, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:34:y:2022:i:1:p:35-58
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298211061516
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09516298211061516
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/09516298211061516?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Lowande, 2018. "Delegation or Unilateral Action?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(1), pages 54-78.
    2. Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, 2019. "Preventing Prevention," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(2), pages 342-352, April.
    3. Bawn, Kathleen, 1997. "Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 101-126, April.
    4. Levy, Gilat, 2004. "Anti-herding and strategic consultation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 503-525, June.
    5. Barry Weingast, 1984. "The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 147-191, January.
    6. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    7. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    8. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    9. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    10. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
    11. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
    12. Cameron Charles M. & Rosendorff B. Peter, 1993. "A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 44-70, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2013. "Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 45-76, February.
    2. Israel Marques II, 2017. "Political Connections and Non-Traditional Investment: Evidence from Public-Private Partnerships in Vocational Education," HSE Working papers WP BRP 56/PS/2017, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    3. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
    4. John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, 2015. "Democratic Rulemaking," NBER Working Papers 21765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Coyne Christopher J. & Goodman Nathan & Hall Abigail R., 2019. "Sounding the Alarm: The Political Economy of Whistleblowing in the US Security State," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 25(1), pages 1-11, February.
    6. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    7. Christian Schultz, 2003. "Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 1104, CESifo.
    8. Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 59-86, January.
    9. Binswanger, Johannes & Prüfer, Jens, 2012. "Democracy, populism, and (un)bounded rationality," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 358-372.
    10. Alvaro Forteza & Juan S. Pereyra, 2021. "Separation of powers with ideological parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(3), pages 333-382, July.
    11. Galina Zudenkova, 2015. "Political cronyism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 473-492, March.
    12. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    13. Duggan, John, 2017. "Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 426-463.
    14. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo & Moreno de Barreda, Inés & Cunningham, Tom, 2012. "Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds," CEPR Discussion Papers 8832, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Miltos Makris, 2003. "Administrative Bureaus with Standard Operating Procedures," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/062, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    16. Leif Helland & Lars Monkerud, 2013. "Electoral agency in the lab: Learning to throw out the rascals," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 214-233, April.
    17. Cyril Benoît, 2021. "Politicians, regulators, and regulatory governance: The neglected sides of the story," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(S1), pages 8-22, November.
    18. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    19. Emmanuelle Auriol & Nicolas Bonneton & Mattias Polborn, 2023. "Shaking Up the System: When Populism Disciplines Elite Politicians," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_473, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    20. Sean Ingham, 2016. "Social choice and popular control," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(2), pages 331-349, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:34:y:2022:i:1:p:35-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.