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The Chain Store Paradox and Constitutional Politics in Canada

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  • Patrick James

Abstract

While Canada is lauded as a prosperous, democratic state, it continues to fail at constitutional reform. Rather than attempting to explain Canadian constitutional development from Confederation onward, this study focuses on the two most recent rounds: the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. The investigation unfolds in six stages. First, rational choice and game theory, which provide the intellectual foundations for the forthcoming analysis, are introduced and linked to the study of constitutional politics. Second, prospects for a priori agreement on a constitutional initiative, independent of political maneuvering among governments and other actors, are assessed. Third, the Chain Store Paradox (CSP), a game-theoretic model, is related to constitutional politics at a general level. Fourth, the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, Canada's major constitutional initiatives in the last decade, are briefly described. Fifth, the CSP is used to explain the failure of the two Accords, which had different origins and contents, to achieve ratification. Sixth, and finally, the likelihood of a constitutional equilibrium is explored in the context of the preceding results, along with implications of the Canadian experience for other federations.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick James, 1999. "The Chain Store Paradox and Constitutional Politics in Canada," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(1), pages 5-36, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:11:y:1999:i:1:p:5-36
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011001001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Reinhard Selten, 1974. "The Chain Store Paradox," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 018, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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