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Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices

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  • Donal G. Saari
  • Katri K. Sieberg

Abstract

A troubling aspect about power indices is how the values assigned to players can depend upon the index. As shown, the problem is more severe; different indices can generate radically different rankings; e.g., a 15-player game exists with over a trillion different strict power index rankings of the players. It is shown that certain indices always share the same ranking, but this assertion depends on the number of players; e.g., the Shapley and Banzhaf rankings agree with three players, but with more players they can even have opposite rankings. It is also shown how changes in certain assumptions affect the outcomes. This includes demonstrating how the rankings change when players drop out of a game.

Suggested Citation

  • Donal G. Saari & Katri K. Sieberg, 1999. "Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices," Discussion Papers 1271, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1271
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ordeshook,Peter C., 1986. "Game Theory and Political Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315937, October.
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    6. Straffin, Philip Jr., 1994. "Power and stability in politics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1127-1151, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

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