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Are Sanctions Effective?

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  • George Tsebelis

    (University of California at Los Angeles)

Abstract

Although economic sanctions have been quite frequent in the twentieth century, a close examination of the low success rate (33 out of 83 cases) indicates that sender countries are not able to select the appropriate cases. Moreover, analysts sometimes offer contradictory advice for such selection. This article provides a game-theoretic explanation of these phenomena. Six different game-theoretic scenarios lead to the same equilibrium outcome. This is a mixed strategy equilibrium. The success ratio is the outcome of the selection of mixed strategies by both sender and receiver countries. Under a wide range of (specified) circumstances, the size of the sanction has no impact upon the behavior of the target country. Finally, some empirical implications of the game-theoretic analysis are compared to existing empirical generalizations, and further implications for empirical research are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • George Tsebelis, 1990. "Are Sanctions Effective?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 3-28, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:34:y:1990:i:1:p:3-28
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002790034001001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Ordeshook,Peter C., 1986. "Game Theory and Political Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315937, October.
    3. Doxey, Margaret, 1972. "International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 527-550, July.
    4. Tsebelis, George, 1989. "The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 77-91, March.
    5. Alt, James E. & Calvert, Randall L. & Humes, Brian D., 1988. "Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 445-466, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jack Hirshleifer & Eric Rasmusen, 1992. "Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 353-367, July.
    2. Langlois Catherine C & Langlois Jean-Pierre P., 2010. "Costly Interference: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Sanctions," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-34, June.
    3. Perry, Logan & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2019. "Foresight in a Game of Leadership," SocArXiv 84yxz, Center for Open Science.
    4. Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
    5. Tim Friehe, 2008. "Correlated payoffs in the inspection game: some theory and an application to corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 127-143, October.
    6. Farshid Pourshahabi & Nazar Dahmardeh, 2015. "Economic Sanctions, Speculative Attacks and Currency Crisis," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 5(2), pages 340-355, February.
    7. Brekhov, Boris, 2019. "Economic Rewards versus Economic Sanctions in International Relations," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203599, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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