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Approval Voting and Parochialism

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan Baron

    (Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Nicole Y. Altman

    (Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Stephan Kroll

    (Department of Economics, California State University at Sacramento)

Abstract

In hypothetical scenarios involving two groups (nations or groups of workers), subjects voted on three proposals: one helped group A (their group), one helped B, and one helped both groups, more than the average of the first two but less than their maximum. When subjects voted for one proposal, most voted for the one that helped group A. This result is “parochial†because it helps the voter’s own group even though it hurts the other group more. When voters could approve two proposals, they tended to approve the third proposal as well, and it was more likely to win. Approval voting can thus reduce the effect of parochialism, a bias toward one’s own group, on election outcomes. In a second experiment, the authors replicated this effect using real-money payoffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Baron & Nicole Y. Altman & Stephan Kroll, 2005. "Approval Voting and Parochialism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(6), pages 895-907, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:49:y:2005:i:6:p:895-907
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002705281152
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peregrine Schwartz-Shea & Randy T. Simmons, 1991. "Egoism, Parochialism, and Universalism," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(1), pages 106-132, January.
    2. Dawes, Robyn M. & Orbell, John M. & Simmons, Randy T. & Van De Kragt, Alphons J. C., 1986. "Organizing Groups for Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1171-1185, December.
    3. Robert J. Weber, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter.
    4. Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Simmons, Randy T, 1990. "The Layered Prisoners' Dilemma: Ingroup versus Macro-efficiency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 61-83, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Menezes, Mozart B.C. & da Silveira, Giovani J.C. & Drezner, Zvi, 2016. "Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and Approval Voting compared with Median and Coverage locations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 253(1), pages 195-203.
    2. Granić, Đura-Georg, 2017. "The problem of the divided majority: Preference aggregation under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 21-38.

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