Approval Voting
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.39
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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