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Recruitment and Allegiance

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  • SCOTT GATES

    (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and Michigan State University)

Abstract

Civil war is fought between two political organizations, the state and a rebel group. Myriad theories of civil war have examined the role of state institutions and state strength, but little attention has been devoted to theorizing about rebel organizations themselves. The organizational structure of rebel groups is examined to understand patterns of recruitment and allegiance. Drawing on principal-agent analysis of participation and incentive compatibility constraints and the analytical tradition of rent-seeking contests, a model is developed to demonstrate that three factors—geography, ethnicity, and ideology—play an important role in determining military success, deterring defection within the rebel group, and shaping recruitment.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Gates, 2002. "Recruitment and Allegiance," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(1), pages 111-130, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:46:y:2002:i:1:p:111-130
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002702046001007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Christopher Blattman, 2009. "Civil War: A Review of Fifty Years of Research," Working Papers id:2231, eSocialSciences.
    3. Eli Berman & Jacob N. Shapiro & Joseph H. Felter, 2011. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(4), pages 766-819.
    4. Håvard Hegre, 2005. "Development and the Liberal Peace," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, pages 17-46.
    5. Tilman Br�ck & Patricia Justino & Philip Verwimp & Andrew Tedesco & Alexandra Avdeenko, 2013. "Measuring Conflict Exposure in Micro-Level Surveys," HiCN Working Papers 153, Households in Conflict Network.
    6. Morelli, Massimo & Rohner, Dominic, 2015. "Resource concentration and civil wars," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 32-47.
    7. Apolte, Thomas, 2014. "Youth bulges, insurrections, and politico-economic institutions," CIW Discussion Papers 2/2014, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    8. Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 45(4), pages 557-573, July.
    9. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010. "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.
    10. Tony Addison & Mansoob Murshed, 2005. "Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 69-82.
    11. Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Working Papers 08-03, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
    12. Tilman Brück & Patricia Justino & Philip Verwimp & Alexandra Avdeenko & Andrew Tedesco, 2016. "Measuring Violent Conflict in Micro-level Surveys: Current Practices and Methodological Challenges," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 31(1), pages 29-58.
    13. Jason Lyall, 2008. "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," HiCN Working Papers 44, Households in Conflict Network.
    14. Syed Mansoob Murshed, 2009. "Threat Perceptions in Europe: Domestic Terrorism and International Crime," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 2, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

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