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To Attack or Not to Attack

Author

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  • Samuel S. G. Wu

    (Texas A & M University)

Abstract

Specific theoretical conditions for the success or failure of extended immediate deterrence (EID) are identified based on assumptions about rational action. The resultant decision theoretic model yields four hypotheses which are tested against cases of EID between 1885 and 1970. The hypotheses are strongly supported, with about 77% of outcomes correctly predicted. In addition, the article distinguishes between two qualitatively different situations in which the model leads us to expect a defender's policy of extended immediate deterrence to succeed or fail. The results are contrasted with Huth's 1988 analysis. The formally derived hypotheses of this analysis fit the data as well as Huth's probit model. The percentage of correct predictions in the model here is slightly, but not statistically significantly, lower than that in Huth's, and the model presented here is more parsimonious than Huth's. Thus the model here seems to be a preferable construct of decision making during extended immediate deterrence situations.

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel S. G. Wu, 1990. "To Attack or Not to Attack," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 531-552, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:34:y:1990:i:3:p:531-552
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002790034003007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & Lalman, David, 1986. "Reason and War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1113-1129, December.
    2. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, 1985. "The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 156-177, March.
    3. Huth, Paul K., 1988. "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 423-443, June.
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